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COMMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POST-CONVICTION DUE PROCESS-RIGHT 
OF INDIGENT TO REVIEW OF NON-CONSTITUTIONAL TRIAL ERRORS-
The past thirty years have seen a steady expansion in the concept 
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of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 
One of the most notable advances has been made in the realm of 
post-conviction procedure.2 Although a state is not required by 
the Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right of appeal 
at all,3 it must provide some "clearly defined method" whereby a 
person. can present to a state court of last resort his claim that he-
was denied some constitutional right at his trial.4 
The purpose of this comment is to examine a new development. 
in post-conviction due process: Griffin v. Illinois.5 This case an-
nounces a new principle of constitutional right under the Four-
teenth Amendment based on an almost indistinguishable combina-
tion of due process and equal protection elements.6 
I. Griffin v. Illinois: The Right to "Adequate and Effective" 
Appellate Review 
Petitioners Griffin and Crenshaw were tried together -and con-
victed of armed robbery in the Criminal Court of Cook County, 
Illinois. They immediately filed a motion in the trial court asking-
that a certified copy of the entire record, including · the steno-
graphic transcript, be furnished to them w~thout cost. They alleged 
that they had no funds with which to purchase the transcript and 
court records, that the documents were needed in order to· prose-
cute an appeal, and that failure of the court to provide the docu-
ments would violate the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment._ Illinois law provides that indigent 
defendants sentenced to death may obtain a free transcript to assist 
their appeals,7 but this privilege is not extended to other criminal 
defendants. Petitioners, not being sentenced to death, failed to 
qualify for a free transcript under that provision. The Illinois Post-
Conviction Hearing Act8 provides for free transcripts for persons 
who desire to appeal denial of relief under its provisions, but only 
1 Gr~en, "The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court," 
46 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1948). · 
2 See Boskey and Pickering, "Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 
UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 266 (1946); 53 CoL. L. REv. 1143 (1953). 
8 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). 
4 Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949). 
5 351 U .s. 12 (1956). 
6 Some other advances in procedural due process have arisen out of cases where due 
process and equal protection were likewise commingled. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 
86 (1923); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also Wilson, "The ·Merging Con-
cep_ts of Liberty 1:1nd Equality," 12 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 182 (1955). 
'1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §769 (a). 
8 Id., §§826-832. 
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,constitutional trial errors can be raised under the act. Petitioners 
did not contend that the errors they wished to appeal involved any 
.constitutional questions, and so this first motion was not made 
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The trial court denied 
this first motion without a hearing. 
They then filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing 
Act, alleging that there were manifest non-constitutional errors in 
their trial and that they were entitled to have their convictions set 
aside on appeal. They charged that they were denied their right 
to full appellate review solely because of their poverty, since the 
trial court had refused them a free transcript, and that this was a 
denial of due process and equal protection. Their petition was 
denied without a hearing, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed 
on the ground that no substantial constitutional questions (the 
only kind of questions that could be raised under the Post-Convic-
tion Hearing Act) had been presented. Their petition for cer-
tiorari to the United States Supreme Court was granted.9 
Illinois law gives every person convicted in a criminal trial the 
right to review by writ of error.10 But this review extends only to 
errors contained in the "mandatory record"11 unless the defendant 
supplies the appellate court with a "bill of exceptions," and this 
bill must include the transcript of those portions of the trial where 
the errors charged occurred. The "mandatory record" does not 
include such important sources of error as motions and rulings of 
the trial court, evidence heard, instructions, etc. Thus the only way 
full review can be had is by providing a bill of exceptions.12 To 
obtain such a bill of exceptions, the defendant must procure a 
stenographic transcript, for which he must pay unless he has been 
sentenced to death. At one time the Illinois courts granted review 
on the basis of a "bystanders' bill of exceptions," which was com-
piled from the memory of persons in attendance at the trial and 
certified as correct by the judge; but the "bystanders' bill" has 
fallen into disuse since the advent of court stenography. More-
over, the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that even if "bystanders' 
bills" are still recognized, they are not, as a practical matter, avail-
able to an incarcerated indigent.13 Petitioners, then, as indigents, 
had no way of securing review of non-constitutional trial errors 
9 349 U.S. 937 (1955). 
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §769.1. 
11 This consists of indictment, arraignment, plea, verdict, and sentence. 
12 People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N.E. (2d) 495 (1948). 
IS People v. Joyce, 1 Ill. (2d) 225, 115 N.E. (2d) 262 (1953). 
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unless they were given a free transcript from which they could 
construct a bill of exceptions. 
The Supreme Court held that review had been unconstitution-
ally denied to the petitioners. A state is not required to provide 
appellate review, 14 but if appeal is allowed at all it must be ex-
tended equally to all persons. "Destitute defendants must be af-
forded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money 
enough to buy transcripts."15 
Most of the cases in which the Court has extended the Four-
teenth Amendment's protections in the area of criminal procedure 
have found their bases in the requirements of the due process 
clause. In some of these landmark cases the question of "funda-
mental fairness" has been colored by a strong element of "unrea-
sonable discrimination,"16 but despite their equal protection 
aspects these cases have been decided and accepted by the profes-
sion as rulings of procedural due process.17 The Griffin case also 
presents a blending of due process and equal protection elements, 
but it is not so clear that the ruling here is one of due process. 
Part of the uncertainty stems from the fact that a majority of the 
Court could not be mustered in support of any one of the four 
opinions of the case. The majority justices, although noting the 
presence of both equal protection and due process elements, did 
not clearly say which of the two is the more basic. Justice Black's 
opinion, in which three other justices joined, expressed the view 
that the " .... constitutional guaranties of due process and equal 
protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow 
no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups 
of persons,"18 and applied this view to the Griffin case by conclud-
ing that "[t]here is no meaningful distinction between a rule which 
would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court 
and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate 
review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in 
advance."19 Does this mean that the case may be regarded as either 
a due process or as an equal protection ruling, or does it mean that 
14 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). 
15 Principal case at 19. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Clark. Justice Frankfurter concurred separately. 
16 See note 6 supra. 
17 There have been a few of these "blended" cases decided on the equal protection 
issue. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 
(1942). 
18 Principal case at 17. Emphasis supplied. 
19 Id. at 18. ' 
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the concurrent presence of both elements is the crucial factor? 
There is no specific language in the opinion to indicate the answer. 
However, the overall impression given by Justice Black's opinion 
corresponds more closely to the traditional due process analysis than 
to the usual equal protection analysis. He regards equal justice as 
"the central aim of our entire judicial system,"20 and matters so fun-
damental as that are usually considered to be the substance of due 
process. The import of Justice Black's opinion, then, seems to be 
that an unreasonable discrimination in the dispensation of crim-
inal justice-at trial or appellate levels-is an arbitrary denial of 
fundamental fairness which the due process clause will not permit. 
The case, in this view, turned on the combined incidence of both 
equal protection and due process factors, with the latter predomi-
nating. 
Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion concurring in the 
new rule formulated in the chief opinion but expressing the view 
that the new rule should not be given a retroactive effect. He, too, 
pointed out both the equal protection and due process aspects of 
the case,21 and, like Justice Black, he did not clearly designate one 
or the other aspect as the primary one. However, Justice Frank-
furter seemed to focus more of his attention on the unreasonable-
ness of the discrimination inherent in Illinois' post-conviction 
procedure. There is language in his opinion which conveys the 
impression that Justice Frankfurter considered the equal protec-
tion issue the dominant one-perhaps a sufficient one-for the dis-
position he made of the case.22 Perhaps this is an additional reason 
for his separate concurrence. If the differences, however, between 
the Black view and the Frankfurter view are as clearcut as the 
difference between due process and equal protection, probably 
Justice Frankfurter would have placed more specific emphasis on 
the point of distinction. His concurrence in the disposition of the 
case does not help to resolve the uncertainty, since the disposition 
of the case would be the same under either due process or equal 
20Id. at 17. 
21 "But neither the fact that a State may deny the right of appeal altogether, nor 
the right of a State to make an appropriate classification, based on differences in crimes 
and their punishments, nor the right of a State to lay down conditions it deems appro• 
priate for criminal appeals, sanctions differentiations by a State that have no relation to 
a rational policy of criminal appeal or authorize the imposition of conditions that offend 
the deepest presuppositions of our society.'' Principal case at 21-22. 
22 "When the case again reaches the Illinois Court, that court may, of course, find 
within the existing resources of Illinois law means of according to petitioners effective 
satisfaction of their constitutional right not to be denied the equal protection of the laws.'' 
Principal case at 25. 
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protection. If equal protection is regarded as the dominant theme 
in Justice Frankfurter's analysis, his view seems to be this: while 
differentiations based on financial ability may not violate the equal 
protection clause in some situations,23 such a discrimination is 
unreasonable and offensive when exercised in the administration 
of criminal justice. This view likewise rests on the concurrence of 
both equal protection and due process elements, but here the 
former are dominant. 
If these interpretations of the two majority opinions are accu-
rate, the precise significance of the Griffin case in constitutional 
law is still in doubt, since a majority of the Court does not clearly 
support any one view. Nevertheless, it is an important new develop-
ment that must be reckoned with, and it cannot be examined with-
out first drawing some conclusion as to what it says. Accordingly, 
the analysis that follows treats the case on the basis of what seems 
to be the "least common denominator" of both majority opinions, 
viz., the coincidence of strong elements of both due process and 
equal protection. 
II. The Meaning of the Griffin Case 
If the Griffin case had decided that all states which extend the 
right of appeal to all must provide the right to proceed on appeal 
in forma pauperis to indigents, the question of its effect would not 
be too complicated. But the case does not go that far. The major-
ity opinion was careful to add, "We do not hold, however, that 
Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case 
where a defendant cannot buy it. The Supreme Court [ of Illinois] 
may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate 
review to indigent defendants."24 The case, then, lays down the 
proposition that indigents must be afforded as "adequate and effec-
tive appellate review" as other criminal defendants; it does not 
prescribe the same review procedure. The majority opinion sug-
gests the possibility that a return to "bystanders bills of excep-
tions" might fulfill this requirement, but it does not otherwise 
elaborate on what will be considered "adequate and effective." It 
simply remands the question to the Illinois court with the implicit 
direction to try again, stating "We are confident that the State 
will provide corrective rules to meet the problem which this case 
23 Cf: Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 329 (1902). Cf. also Sholley, "Equal Protection in 
Tax Legislation," 24 VA. L. REv. 229 at 256 et seq. (1938). 
24 Principal case at 20. 
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lays bare."211 The question of what review procedures will be con-
sidered "adequate and effective" can receive an authoritative an-
swer only in future decisions. The fact, however, that the decision 
in the Griffin case was such a close one indicates that future deci-
sions may well find procedures "adequate and effective" which do 
not go much farther than the Illinois system in providing appellate 
review for indigents. 
One other statement in the majority opinion may prove trou-
blesome. What was meant by Justice Black's reservation that, "We 
do not hold ... that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's tran-
script in every case where a defendant cannot buy it"?20 This 
phrase may imply merely that a stenographer's transcript may not 
always be necessary to secure equally "adequate and effective" re-
view, and this probably is the meaning Justice Black intended, 
judging from the context in which the phrase appears. On the 
other hand, the phrase "not ... in every case" could be interpreted 
as a holding that the scope of review required by the Griffin case 
may vary, as in the "right to counsel" cases, with the nature of the 
crime with which the defendant is charged. In support of this in-
terpretation it may be pointed out that the conviction from which 
appeal was sought in the Griffin case was for "armed robbery." 
That crime in Illinois is a very serious one,27 carrying a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment and subjecting a person convicted 
thereof to certain civil disabilities.28 If the Griffin decision is re-
garded as essentially a due process ruling, it may be said that the 
seriousness of the crime there involved might require more leni-
ency in providing appeal in the interest of "fundamental fairness" 
than would be demanded if a lesser crime were charged. The 
nature of the crime charged is an important factor in determining 
whether a criminal defendant is entitled to free counsel.20 Should 
it not be likewise a factor in determining his right to a free appeal? 
Even if the Griffin case finds its support solely in the equal pro-
tection clause, can it be said that a classification based on the sever-
ity of the crime charged is unreasonable? This sort of classification 
has been upheld in the "right to counsel" cases.30 
If this line of argument is accepted by the federal courts in 
25Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §501. 
28 Id., §587. 
20 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
SO Ibid. 
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future cases, the meaning of the Griffin case will be uncertain in-
deed. To follow the analogy of the right to counsel cases would 
entail deciding the right of indigent defendants to free appellate 
review on a case by case basis. In view of the narrow division of the 
Court on the question, as indicated by the four separate opinions in 
the Griffin case, a case by case approach would set post-conviction 
due process adrift in a sea of uncertainty, for the absence of one 
member of the Court in the consideration of any given petition for 
relief under the ruling of the Griffin case could cause a different 
result in the disposition of that petition. States would be left un-
certain as to whether their post-trial procedures complied with due 
process requirements, and individual defendants would be uncer-
tain as to their rights. 
In addition to its effect in creating 'uncertainty, other objec-
tions can be made to the analogy of the right to counsel cases. In 
the first place, it is clearly not the approach contemplated by the 
opinions of Justices Black and Frankfurter. The general meaning 
of both opinions is that any defendant entitled by law to review 
of trial errors may not be denied such review solely by reason of 
his poverty. It is the right to appeal that is significant, not the 
character of the crime charged. Moreover, there is a fundamental 
distinction between the right to counsel cases and the Griffin type 
of situation. While it is undeniable that the assistance of skilled 
counsel may be of inestimable value to a defendant, the presence 
of counsel is not a sine qua non to access to the courts, as was the 
availability of the transcript in the Griffin case. Indeed, in cases 
where the existence of an attorney has been necessary to give in-
carcerated criminals access to the courts, this has been held an 
unconstitutional denial of equal protection.31 If any analogy to 
the right to counsel area is drawn, it should be limited to those 
cases where access to the courts could be had only through an at-
torney. The better interpretation of the Griffin case, then, is that 
it requires a state to provide appellate review for indigent crim-
inal defendants equivalent to that provided for other criminal 
defendants.32 The seriousness of the crime should not be deter-
31 Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942). See also United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. 
Ragen, (N.D. Ill. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 973, affd. (7th Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 349, cert. den. 
325 U.S. 865 (1945). 
32 Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion expresses the view that to require some defend-
ants to pay for services which are given to others free involves a discrimination equally 
as invidious as the one which denies services to those who cannot pay for them but 
extends them to those who can. 
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minative, except as it may bear on the question of "adequacy" of 
the appeal. 
Will the principle of the Griffin case be given application in 
review of civil cases? There is little room to doubt that the major-
ity opinions contemplated its application to criminal cases only. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, guarantees that property 
as well as life and liberty shall not be taken without due process 
of law. A civil litigant who has exhausted his own resources in a 
trial to preserve his property, or who has been deprived of his 
resources by the judgment itself, is in a position analogous to that 
of an indigent convict. To refuse him the right to a review of the 
adverse judgment simply because he cannot pay the costs of appeal 
in advance when such appeal is granted to others similarly situated 
but better endowed would seem to involve, in principle, the same 
denial of due process and equal protection as that claimed by peti-
tioners Griffin and Crenshaw. There are, however, at least two fac-
tors which may serve to distinguish the case of the indigent civil 
litigant. First, our legal system has traditionally been inclined to 
regard "personal" rights, such as life and liberty, as entitled to 
more deference than property rights,33 i.e., the process that is "due" 
in order to protect life and liberty may be more extensive than 
that required to protect property. Since only five of nine justices 
found an unconstitutional deprivation in the Griffin case, where 
the petitioner's personal liberty was at staker it would not be safe 
to assume that a majority of the Court would find a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment under the same circumstances if prop-
erty rights only were involved.34 Secondly, the unconstitutional 
elements in the Griffin case resulted solely from the action (or 
inaction) of official state agents. The Fourteenth Amendment 
serves to protect individual rights against infringement by the state 
government, not infringement by individuals. While it is true 
that a civil adjudication of property rights by a state is "state ac-
tion" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,35 the 
state's role in the resultant deprivation of one party's property is. 
purely mediatory. The state does not act both as party and as, 
33 An example of this tendency may be found in the tort law doctrine which limits 
the amount of force that may be used against the person of a trespasser where only prop-
erty interests are jeopardized by the trespass. " ..• [T]he law has always placed a higher 
value upon human safety than upon mere rights in property •... " PROSSER, TORTS 133 
(1941). 
84 This situation might occur in a criminal case as well if the defendant were fined 
rather than imprisoned. 
35 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948). 
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mediator, as it does in the criminal cases. The state may well be 
required to go to greater lengths to insure fairness in situations 
where it opposes the asserted rights of an individual in both of 
these capacities. Therefore, it may not be an "invidious discrim-
ination" to deny the right of appeal to an indigent civil litigant, 
even though the sole basis of the denial is his poverty, and even 
though an indigent criminal defendant would be entitled to appeal 
in like circumstances. Justice Harlan, however, considered the 
civil situation to be indistinguishable from that presented in the 
Griffin case: "Thus, if requiring defendants in felony cases to pay 
for a transcript constitutes a discriminatory denial to indigents of 
the rights of appeal available to others, why is not a similar denial 
in misdemeanor cases or, for that matter, civil cases? It is no answer 
to say that equal protection is not an absolute, and that in other 
than criminal cases the differentiation is 'reasonable.' The result-
ing classification would be invidious in all cases, and an invidious 
classification offends equal protection regardless of the seriousness 
of the consequences."36 This argument has merit, but it is directed 
solely at the question of equal protection. He fails to consider the 
due process aspect of the case in this particular statement. The 
distinction between the due process and equal protection elements 
here is not so clear as to justify an extension of the doctrine to civil 
cases when that extension considers only one element to the ex-
clusion of the other. Any extension of the doctrine of the Griffin 
case should be limited to cases where due process and equal pro-
tection are similarly fused, and it should be applied only in crim-
inal cases. 
III. Impact ·of the Griffin Case 
A. On state practice. Unless the Griffin principle is carried 
over into the area of civil review, it probably will not cause any 
immediate, significant changes in the practice of most states. In 
twenty-nine states free transcripts are already provided as of right 
to indigents convicted of non-capital crimes.37 Of the remaining 
nineteen, five states have, by statute, expressly given the trial courts 
discretionary power to provide such transcripts. Two more appar-
ently have made transcripts available on a similar basis by decision 
or by interpretation of statutes relating to reimbursement of ap-
· so Principal case at 35. 
37 Id. at 33. 
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pointed counsel.38 The procedures already provided in states 
where the free transcript is available at the discretion of the trial 
court will probably be "adequate and effective" so long as the trial 
courts grant the transcript in every case where there is a reasonable 
basis for appeal, for the Griffin case probably does not require free 
review to be given to defendants who have no reasonable basis for 
appeal, or who do not present a good faith claim for relief.39 The 
right to a free transcript is discretionary with the trial judge in the 
federal courts,40 and this procedure has never been held to violate 
Fifth Amendment due process. It therefore appears that only 
eleven states have no provision for making free transcripts avail-
able on a satisfactory basis. 
Even the practice in these eleven states, however, may not need 
to be changed.41 In the Griffin case, not only were petitioners de-
nied a free transcript, but that transcript was necessary in order to 
secure a full appellate review. It will only be those states who not 
only deny the free transcript, but who also require a transcript for 
review, that will be forced by the Griffin case to modify their prac-
tice. For example, if a state permits the use of the "bystanders bill 
of exceptions" in lieu of appeal based on the transcript, this would 
probably satisfy the standard set forth in Justice Black's opinion. 
As to the situation in Illinois, counsel for the state expressed 
the belief in the Griffin case that if the treatment of petitioners 
violated the due process and equal protection clauses, the Illinois 
Post-Conviction Hearing Act entitles them to a free transcript.42 
While this may be true, it would seem to be an unnecessarily com-
plicated process. That act, by its terms, applies only to a "person 
imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings 
which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of 
his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the 
State of Illinois or both .... "43 Overlooking the limitation of the 
act's coverage to persons "imprisoned in the penitentiary," it will 
38 See principal case at 33, n. 4. See, generally, annotation, "Right of indigent de-
fendant in a criminal case to aid of state as regards new trial or appeal," 100 A.L.R. 321 
(1936). 
30 See note 62 infra. 
40 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1915 (b), 753 (f). 
41 The Attorney General of Kansas has expressed the opinion that the Griffin case 
requires Kansas courts to provide free transcripts to indigent criminal defendants for 
appeal purposes. 5 KAN. L. REv. 132 (1956). The opinion also discusses the question of 
possible retroactive effect of the Griffin ruling and the practical question of who must bear 
the cost of the free transcript. 
42 Principal case at 16. 
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §826. 
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be noted that it applies only to the situation where there has been 
a substantial denial of constitutional rights "in the proceeding 
which resulted in his conviction." Griffin and Crenshaw did not 
assert that there was any denial of constitutional rights in their 
trial. Under the Supreme Court's ruling, no unconstitutionality 
was involved until after the conviction had been rendered and the 
--petitioners had moved for a free transcript. Even if the phrase 
•'proceeding which resulted in . . . conviction" can be interpreted 
to include the motion for a free transcript, there is no denial of a 
constitutional right until the judge overrules the motion. Only 
then could a defendant file a petition under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act. But this second proceeding, under the act, cannot, 
of itself grant a petitioner the free transcript. It can only deter-
mine whether or not a constitutional right has been denied. If 
the hearing court rules that a constitutional right has been denied, 
it can "enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or 
sentence in the former proceedings and such supplementary orders 
as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, or discharge as may be 
necessary and proper."44 Presumably, all that the hearing court 
can do, if it should find for a petitioner like Griffin and Crenshaw, 
is to order the trial court to order the transcript. The circular 
character of this process seems wholly unnecessary, particularly 
since the court which hears the petition under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act is the same court which rendered the conviction and 
the denial of the motion for a free transcript.45 Probably no real 
harm will be done by this procedure, since the whole thing can 
doubtless be accomplished at one sitting, but it would probably be 
better simply to empower the trial court to provide the transcript 
on the first motion, if no satisfactory existing means are found. 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,46 promulgated 
in 1953, goes- farther than the Illinois act. States adopting the 
uniform act probably need have little fear that their procedures 
will not be "adequate and effective" under the commands of the 
Griffin case. The uniform act not only attempts to provide a 
"clearly defined method by which ... claims of federal right" may 
be raised, in accordance with the command of the Court in Young 
v. Ragen;41 it also grants the same type of hearing for any other 
collateral attack "upon any ground of alleged error heretofore 
44 Id., §831. 
45 Id., §826. 
46 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LA.ws, 1955, p. 209. See also 69 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1956). 
47 337 U.S. 235 (1949). 
1957] COMMENTS 425 
available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or 
other common law or statutory remedy .... "48 Even this broad 
coverage, however, would make the scope of the uniform act no 
broader than that of Illinois if there were not some other features 
of the uniform act which serve to expand its applicability. Section 
5 of the uniform act contains very liberal provisions for review 
where the petitioner is "proceeding as a poor person." This pro-
vision provides that "all necessary costs and expenses" incident to 
review, expressly including printing, stenographic services, and 
attorney's fees, shall be paid for a petitioner who is himself unable 
to pay.40 Moreover, the hearing judge under the uniform act is 
empowered to make such orders, supplementary to his ruling on 
the judgment and sentence, as "may be necessary and proper."50 
By virtue of these powers, the hearing judge could fonvard the 
case directly for appeal of the non-constitutional trial errors and 
could also provide the necessary services free. There would be no 
need for the circular steps which the Illinois act seems to entail. 
B. On federal practice. One effect of the Griffin case on 
federal practice is that it appears to create a new area in which 
federal habeas corpus is available to correct state procedural de-
fects. Heretofore, federal habeas corpus has been granted only 
where constitutional trial errors were charged. Now federal courts 
may grant habeas corpus in situations like that in the Griffin case 
even when the only trial errors alleged are of a non-constitutional 
character. This development yields the strange result that federal 
courts could set free a prisoner whose trial was conducted in con-
formance with due process of law. 
The federal habeas corpus law authorizes granting the writ 
where a prisoner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution ... 
of the United States.''51 It might be argued that this does not au-
thorize federal habeas corpus in a Griffin type situation. The 
petitioners there were in custody pursuant to an order of a duly 
authorized court, and the order was entirely within the court's 
jurisdiction. No violations of the petitioners' constitutional rights 
occurred in the course of the trial. They were therefore com-
mitted to custody in conformance with due process by the judg-
ment of conviction entered against them. It might be urged that 
any violations of their constitutional rights occurring subsequently 
-iS Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, §1. See note 46 supra. 
40 Id., §5. See note 46 supra. 
c;o Id., §7. See note 46 supra. 
Cil 28 U.S.C. (1952) §2241. 
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would have no effect on -the validity of their "custody."· This 
argument, however, overlooks the fact that petitioners claimed a 
right to release from that custody, and this right was denied them 
in violation of the Constitution. In other words, after their mo-
tion for free appeal had been denied, solely because of their 
poverty, petitioners were then in custody in violation of the Con-
stitution, and they then became eligible for habeas corpus in the 
federal courts.62 
Assuming that federal habeas corpus is available to an indigent 
prisoner claiming an unconstitutional denial of the right of appeal, 
what disposition can the federal district court make of the case? 
The law provides that the federal court shall ". . . dispose of the 
matter as law and justice require."53 If the federal court deter-
mines that the petitioner's right of appeal has been unconstitution-
ally denied, does "law and justice" require that he be set free? 
This result does not seem to be called for. All that has been deter-
mined is that petitioner has a right to appeal. The federai court 
has no power to set aside the judgment of conviction when it is 
found to contain no constitutional errors. Other prisoners are 
not set at large while their appeals are pending. But what other 
disposition can the federal court make? It has no power to make 
positive demands upon the state courts. All that can be done by 
the federal court is to order the future release of the prisoner if the 
state has not removed the obstacles to his appeal within a stated 
reasonable time. Under such an order, if the state fails to remove 
the obstacles, federal habeas corpus will set free a prisoner whose 
incarceration had been effected by a conviction which no one 
challenges as lacking in due process. It cannot be denied that this 
is a new departure.64 
The changes wrought by this new feature of federal habeas 
corpus may not, however, be too far-reaching in practical effect. 
As we have seen, most states probably will encounter little difficulty 
in providing "adequate and effective" review to indigent criminals 
under their existing laws. Moreover, even among those few states 
which still may not provide the proper opportunity for review in 
52 Of course, they were not fully entitled to seek federal habeas corpus until they had 
appealed, and the state supreme court had affirmed, the denial of the motion. See 28 
U.S.C. (1952) §2254. They might also be required to apply to the United States Supreme 
Court for certiorari (as Griffin and Crenshaw, in fact, did) before applying for federal 
habeas corpus. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). 
63 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2243. 
64 See Holtzoff, "Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts," 25 Bosr. UNIV. 
L. R.Ev. 26 (1945). In the situation presented in the text, the question would be raised as 
to whether the prisoner so released could be subsequently re-tried. 
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the first instance, it is very unlikely that any would fail to heed 
the federal court's directive. Such non-compliance would ul-
timately be more costly for the state, for the costs of appeal would 
not be so great as the cost to the state if the prisoner were to be 
re-tried after his release by the order of the federal court. 
A more subtle question raised by the Griffin case is that of its 
meaning and effect for purposes of federal practice itself. Will the 
Griffin ruling necessitate any changes in the rights accorded indi-
gents convicted in the federal courts? At first sight it would seem 
that no significant changes will be necessary. A federal statute 
provides: "Any court of the United States may authorize .the 
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment 
of fees and costs or security therefor, by a citizen who makes 
affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security there-
for."55 This provision would seem to provide amply for "adequate 
and effective" review for indigents. But to make sure there is no 
chance of effective denial of these -rights, it is elsewhere provided 
that "fees for transcripts furnished in criminal or habeas corpus 
proceedings to persons allowed to sue, defend, or appeal in forma 
pauperis shall be paid by the United States .... "56 From these 
provisions it is clear that the federal practice contemplates equal 
opportunities for indigents. This has not always been the result 
in practice. Th_ese provisions have been held57 not to entitle an 
indigent petitioner to a free transcript for use in preparing a mo-
tion to vacate under section 2255 of the federal judicial code.58 
Such a holding, however, does not run contrary to the Griffin 
ruling, for a trans~ript is not absolutely necessary to the prosecution 
of a motion to vacate under section 2255. It is a convenience, of 
course, to be able to comb the transcript for possible errors, but 
access to the courts is available without it.59 
The Griffin case will, however, involve a considerable change 
in the theory under which federal practice extends equal rights 
to indigents. It is clear that the federal courts have heretofore 
regarded in forma pauperis proceedings as a matter of privilege, 
not of right. "The right to appeal from a final decision of the 
District Court is a matter of right, [but] the right to appeal as a 
poor person, without being required to prepay fees and costs in 
Iii.I 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1915 (a). 
56 Id., §753 (f). 
57 United States v. Stevens, (3d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 866. 
58 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2255. 
59 But see 104 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 552 (1956). 
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the appellate court, is regulated by statute."60 This theory ha,; 
persisted largely because federal law gives the trial court power 
to deny the privilege of in forma pauperis appeal by certifying 
that the appeal is not taken "in good faith."61 This discretion of 
the trial court is not necessarily inconsistent with the due process 
requirement of the Griffin case.62 If an indigent convict is denied 
appellate review only when he does not appeal in good faith, he 
can scarcely have been denied "adequate and effective" review 
commensurate with that available to non-indigents. The federal 
judges have generally been careful to resolve every doubt in favor 
of the petitioner before ruling that his appeal is taken in bad 
faith.63 Neither due process nor equal protection would seem to 
require a court to hear bad faith appeals. 
The fact that federal courts sometimes will grant the right to 
appeal in forma pauperis, but refuse the right to a free transcript,64 
is not in contradiction to the principle of the Griffin holding. 
Such a transcript is not essential to appeal in the federal courts. 
"Bystanders' bills of exceptions" -are permitted, though little used 
in this day when free transcripts are liberally granted.65 
So far we have assumed that if the Griffin doctrine is due 
process for the states, it will also be due process for the federal 
government, demanded by the Fifth Amendment. The Court has 
not previously held the states to stricter procedural requirements 
in the name of due process than those prevailing in federal prac-
tice. Even if the Griffin case is interpreted as announcing a rule 
of equal protection alone, this would not seem to deny it status as 
a constitutional requirement in federal courts. The absence of a 
federal eq~al protection clause has often been met by including 
60 United States ex rel. Rasmussen v. Ragen, (7th Cir. 1945) 146 F. (2d) 516. See 
also Clough v. Hunter, (10th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 516. 
0128 U.S.C. (1952) §1915 (a). 
62 The recent case of Johnson v. United States, (2d Cir. 1956) 25 U.S. Law Week 2213, 
upholds this conclusion. In that case an indigent defendant argued that the Griffin ruling 
required that he be provided a free transcript, despite the trial court's certification that 
his appeal was not taken in good faith. The court of appeals refused to review the trial 
court's certification unless defendant could show that the trial judge had acted in bad 
faith in refusing the transcript. Judge Frank dissented. Only if a transcript were before 
the court of appeals, he said, could it determine whether or not the trial court acted in 
good faith. Therefore, in Judge Frank's view, refusal of a free transcript to defendant 
denied him adequate and effective review commensurate with that provided for non-indi-
gents. This view must rest upon the fact that a transcript is "necessary." Such a view 
seems to overlook the availability of the "bystanders bill of exceptions"-a measure au-
thorized by Juc;Ige Frank himself in United States v. Sevilla, (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 879-
as a means for providing a record for appellate review in federal courts. See note 65 infra. 
63 See Parsell v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 232. 
64 Morris v. Igoe, (7th Cir. 1953) 209 F. (2d) 108. 
65 Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192, 601 (1942); United States v. Sevilla, (2d Cir. 
1949) 174 F. (2d) 879. 
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the rights secured against state infringement by the Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection clause among those secured against 
federal infringement in the Fifth Amendment due process clause.00 
Thus, equal protection rights have sometimes been treated as con-
stitutional demands on the federal system as well as on the states. 
The Griffin case gives no indication that the equalization principle 
it sets forth is to be considered as a "privilege of citizens of the 
United States" rather than a due process requirement. Unless, 
then, the Court intended the Griffin principle to apply to the 
states only, which does not seem likely, it should now be regarded 
.as a right guaranteed against federal infringement by the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
One interesting example of the effect of the holding might be 
noted. Due process is a right of every person. Its protection is 
not limited to citizens.67 Therefore, the right of an indigent alien 
to "adequate and effective" review should be protected by the due 
process clause in the same degree as the right of an indigent citizen. 
This is not the case under current federal practice. It will be re-
called that section 1915 of the federal judicial code68 limits the 
right to proceed in forma pauperis to "citizens." Section 753 (£)00 
extends free transcripts only to "persons allowed to sue, defend, or 
appeal in forma pauperis." Thus aliens are denied the right to 
appeal in forma pauperis and the right to a free transcript.70 This 
is not quite the same situation as that posed by the Griffin case, but 
it seems to involve the same principle. An indigent alien is denied 
as "adequate and effective" review as other persons similarly 
situated, not because of his poverty, since the federal practice 
compensates for inequalities in wealth, but solely because of his 
alienage. Is this "due process" consistent with the Griffin opinion? 
It would seem not. Due process extends to aliens and citizens 
alike. Therefore alienage is not a reasonable basis of classification 
on which to deny a right which has been declared to be guaranteed 
by the due process clause. 
Of course, the Griffin case did not say that in forma pauperis 
appeal is mandatory. "Bystanders bills" may substitute for a 
oo See Antieau, "Equal Protection Outside the Clause," 40 CALIF. L. REv. 362 (1952); 
Wilson, "The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality," 12 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 182 
(1955). 
07 " ••• nor shall any person .•• be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .•• ," U.S. CONST., Amend. V. 
os 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1915 {a). 
69 28 u.s.c. (1952) §753 (f). 
70 DeMaurez v. Swope, (9th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 530; United States v. Sevilla, (2d 
Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 879. 
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stenographer's transcript in federal courts. Free counsel can be 
appointed for aliens.71 This was the manner in which appeal was. 
provided for the defendant alien-indigent in United States v. 
Sevilla.12 But there was no way in which the "filing fee" in the 
appellate court could be paid for Sevilla-that much he had to 
provide from his own resources. Perhaps the review provided in 
the Sevilla case could be considered "adequate and effective." But 
· what if he had been so poor that he could not even pay the $25 
filing fee? If this were the case, the situation would be indistin-
guishable from the Griffin case.73 Sevilla would be deprived of 
the right to appeal enjoyed by others solely because of his poverty. 
A case is conceivable, then, under today's federal practice where 
"adequate and effective". appellate review may be denied an in-
digent criminal defendant solely because of his poverty. 
The fact that free appeal is not provided for aliens-at least 
not on the same basis as for citizens-indicates that appeal has not 
in fact been a matter of right in the federal courts. The theory of 
appeal will be changed as a result of the Griffin case, even though 
there may be little effective impact in actual practice. 
Summary 
The Griffin case is an amalgam of equal protection and due 
process elements. It is- a novel development in theory, but the 
immediate changes it will impose in actual practice will probably 
fall far short of being revolutionary. Most states already provide 
procedures for review which, with very little alteration, will prob• 
ably conform to that demanded by the Griffin case. The existing 
federal practice (with minor exceptions) probably goes farther 
than is required in providing equal opportunities for review to 
indigents. It is impossible to speculate on the ultimate impact of 
the Griffin case on the future course of constitutional law. Cer-
tainly it goes farther than any case to date in imposing a constitu-
tional duty on the states to equalize the economic circumstances of 
its citizens. But whether this equal protection aspect of the case 
will have individual vitality when separated from the strong due 
process element which was present in the Griffin case will remain 
to be answered in the future.74 
Robert C. Casad, S.Ed. 
7128 U.S.C. (1952) §1915 (d); United States v. Sevilla, (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 879. 
72 (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 879. 
73 The conclusion seems inescapable unless the $25 would be considered de minimis. 
74 See Wilson, "The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality," 12 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 182 (1955). 
